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THE TROUBLE WITH BASIC: PRICE 
DISTORTION AFTER HALLIBURTON 
JILL E. FISCH

 
ABSTRACT 
Many commentators credit the Supreme Court’s decision in Basic, Inc. 
v. Levinson, which allowed courts to presume reliance rather than 
requiring individualized proof, with spawning a vast industry of private 
securities fraud litigation. Today, the validity of Basic’s holding has come 
under attack as scholars have raised questions about the extent to which 
the capital markets are efficient. In truth, both these views are overstated. 
Basic’s adoption of the fraud on the market presumption reflected a 
retreat from prevailing lower court recognition that the application of a 
reliance requirement was inappropriate in the context of impersonal 
public market transactions. And, contrary to arguments currently being 
made to the Supreme Court in the Amgen case, fraud on the market theory 
does not require a strong degree of market efficiency—but merely that 
market prices respond to information. 
The Basic decision had another, less widely-recognized effect, 
however. It began shifting the nature of private securities fraud claims 
from transaction-based claims to market-based claims, a shift that was 
completed by the Court’s later decision in Dura. The consequence of this 
shift was to convert the nature of the plaintiff’s harm from a corruption of 
the investment decision to one of transacting at a distorted price. 
The legal significance of price distortion was at the heart of the 
Halliburton decision. The lower court confused two temporally distinct 
concepts: ex ante price distortion, which is part of the reliance inquiry, 
and ex post price distortion, which is a component of loss causation. The 
Supreme Court limited its holding in Halliburton to identifying this 
confusion, leaving examination of the appropriate role of price distortion 
for future cases. In Amgen, the Court may be forced to tackle this 
question. This Article argues that Amgen highlights the incongruity of 
considering price distortion at the class certification stage and provides 
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an opportunity for the Court to reconsider and reject Basic’s insistence on 
retaining a reliance requirement. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson
1
 is widely 
credited with spawning a vast industry of securities fraud litigation by 
removing the requirement of individualized proof of reliance as an 
obstacle to class certification.
2
 Modern criticisms of private litigation 
coupled with questions about the validity of the economic premises on 
which Basic relied have led critics to question the legitimacy of the 
Court’s holding in Basic.
3
 Most recently, with the Supreme Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari in Amgen,
4
 commentators are again speculating 
that the Court may use this case as an opportunity to overrule Basic.
5
 
Generally, criticism of Basic mischaracterizes the decision. Basic did 
not release federal securities fraud from its moorings in common law fraud 
 
 
 1. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 2. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 151, 152 (stating that “[t]ens of billions of dollars have changed hands in settlements of 
10b-5 lawsuits in the last twenty years as a result of Basic”); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and 
the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 663 (1992) (stating that “the rate at 
which securities fraud class action suits were filed nearly tripled between April 1988, just after Basic 
was decided, and June 1991”); Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 
2179 (2011) (No. 09-1403), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 445, at *6 (Basic “significantly expanded 
the Rule 10b-5 implied right of action by creating a fraud-on-the-market presumption in order to 
permit securities fraud plaintiffs to meet class certification requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 
23.”). 
 3. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 77 (2011) (advocating “removing the Basic presumption and imposing 
an actual reliance requirement”); Mahoney, supra note 2, at 670 (arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court 
would benefit shareholders by confessing that it erred in Basic when it adopted FOTM”); Frederick C. 
Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455 
(2006) (reviewing academic studies raising questions about whether investors and markets are rational 
to the extent necessary to support Basic’s reasoning). 
 4. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
132 S. Ct. 2742 (June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1085). 
 5. See, e.g., Britt K. Latham & M. Jason Hale, The Supreme Court’s Review of the Amgen 
Decision May Cause it to Reconsider the ‘Fraud-On-The-Market’ Presumption, THOMSON REUTERS 
NEWS & INSIGHT (Aug. 13, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/Insight/2012/ 
08_-_August/The_Supreme_Court%E2%80%99s_review_of_the_Amgen_decision_may_cause_it_to_ 
reconsider_the__Fraud-On-The-Market__presumption/ (“In light of the difficulties in applying Basic 
over the years, the Supreme Court may well use Amgen to reconsider (and even replace) Basic’s 
‘fraud-on-the-market’ presumption with an alternative.”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, 
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds (Nov. 5, 2012) (No. 11-1085) (Scalia, J.), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-1085.pdf (questioning whether 
the Court should “overrule Basic because it was certainly based upon a theory that—that simply 
collapses once you remove the materiality element”). 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss3/8
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and deceit. Rather, by retaining the reliance requirement in federal 
securities fraud litigation, Basic reflected judicial conservatism. Despite 
contemporaneous recognition by lower courts and commentators that a 
reliance requirement was anomalous in the context of impersonal 
transactions in the public securities markets,
6
 the Supreme Court refused 
to reject reliance outright. Instead, the Court constructed a complex theory 
of market integrity relying on the fact that, in an efficient market, 
fraudulent public statements distort stock prices.
7
 According to the Basic 
Court, the existence of this price distortion justifies a rebuttable 
presumption of reliance.
8
 
The Basic presumption simplified the class certification inquiry for a 
time by relieving plaintiffs of the need to establish individualized reliance. 
The rationale for the Basic presumption, however, reflected a shift in the 
underlying objectives of securities fraud litigation. Specifically, as this 
Article will explain, the price distortion theory on which Basic was 
premised had the effect of converting securities fraud from a transaction-
based wrong—akin to common law deceit—into a market-based claim.
9
 
At the same time, because it used the fraud on the market theory 
(“FOTM”) as the basis for its ruling, Basic deflected the reliance inquiry 
into an analysis of market efficiency. Following Basic, courts rapidly 
limited the availability of the Basic presumption to cases involving 
 
 
 6. See infra Part I.A (describing context in which the Supreme Court decided Basic). 
 7. Cf. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008) (holding 
that fraudulent statements that are not communicated directly to the public markets are an insufficient 
basis for securities fraud liability). But see id. at 171–72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
“petitioner . . . alleged that respondents knew their deceptive acts would be the basis for statements 
that would influence the market price of Charter stock on which shareholders would rely”). 
 8. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). This Article uses the term “price distortion” to 
reflect the concept that fraudulent information has an effect on the price of a security in the sense that, 
absent such information, the price at which the security traded would be different. Courts and 
commentators have also used the term “price impact.” Although some commentators use the terms 
interchangeably, this Article uses price impact instead to describe a situation in which the price of a 
security changes in response to the dissemination of information. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 
27, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (No. 09-1403) (Respondent’s 
counsel arguing that Petitioners are required to show price impact—that is, that Respondent’s 
misrepresentations moved the market at the time of the fraud or that “price[s] decline[d] following a 
corrective disclosure”). Cases involving price impact are a subset of all cases in which prices have 
been distorted by fraudulent information. 
 9. Arguably, this is consistent with the evolution of federal securities laws from investor to 
market protection focus. For example, Congress added a requirement in the National Securities 
Markets Improvements Act of 1996 that, in enacting regulation, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission consider the degree to which its rules would “promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.” Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106, 110 Stat. 3416, 3434 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006)) (adding § 2(b)). 
Wash U Law Repository
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efficient markets.
10
 Although market efficiency is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition to establish that misinformation has distorted prices, 
most courts have concluded that the threshold inquiry in Basic is satisfied 
by proof that the misrepresentations were publicly made and “that the 
stock traded in an efficient market.”
11
 
With a few exceptions, courts have ruled that an independent analysis 
of price distortion is unnecessary to obtain the Basic presumption.
12
 One 
of the exceptions was the Fifth Circuit.
13
 In Archdiocese of Milwaukee 
Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton,
14
 the Fifth Circuit held that, to 
obtain class certification under Basic, the plaintiffs must prove that the 
defendant’s misrepresentation affected the market price of the security.
15
 
The court explained that this price impact could be established in one of 
two ways—through a stock price reaction at the time of the fraudulent 
statement or through a stock price response to the revelation of truth.
16
 The 
latter showing is equivalent to that required to establish the element of loss 
causation.
17
 
The Halliburton case thus offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to 
reexamine Basic’s fundamental premises, specifically, the normative 
implications of focusing on price distortion in defining the contours of a 
claim for private securities fraud. The Court declined the invitation. 
Reluctant to disturb the delicate balance created by its prior decisions, and 
 
 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2185 (“It is common ground, for example, that plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known (else how would the market take 
them into account?), that the stock traded in an efficient market, and that the relevant transaction took 
place ‘between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed.’” 
(quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27)). 
 12. See, e.g., In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 636–37 (3d Cir. 2011) (considering and 
rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiffs should be required to prove “market impact” in order to 
gain the benefit of the Basic presumption). For the exception, see, for example, Berks County 
Employees’ Retirement Fund v. First American Corp., 734 F. Supp. 2d 533, 541 n.52 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(finding no Rule 23(b)(3) predominance where there was “‘no evidence’ that any of the alleged 
misrepresentations resulted in an ‘immediate increase’ in First American's stock price and ‘no 
evidence’ that any corrective disclosure ‘caused an immediate decrease’ in stock price”). 
 13. In Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that 
plaintiffs were required to establish loss causation by a preponderance of the evidence in order to 
obtain class certification. 487 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 2007). A variety of circuits have faced this 
question and reached varying conclusions. See, e.g., In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d at 631; 
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 
544 F.3d 474, 483–84 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 14. 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 15. Id. at 335. 
 16. Id.  
 17. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–46 (2005) (holding that allegations of 
price inflation, without more, were insufficient to establish loss causation). 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss3/8
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perhaps wary of entrusting policing the markets to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in light of ongoing questions about the 
vigor of the agency’s enforcement efforts,
18
 the Court eschewed a broad-
based holding and relied instead on a rigid characterization of the lower 
court’s analysis. Although it reaffirmed the vitality of the Basic 
presumption, the Court explicitly refused to consider the role of price 
distortion in obtaining that presumption.
19
 
The Halliburton decision reflected the Fifth Circuit’s confusion 
between two temporal concepts
20
—price distortion at the time of the fraud 
and price impact when the fraud is revealed to the market—that serve 
distinct objectives. Understanding these objectives is critical in 
determining the appropriate scope of private securities fraud litigation. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Halliburton did not 
confront the increasing stress placed on Basic by the evolving approach to 
class certification.
21
 That issue is squarely presented to the Supreme Court 
in the Amgen case.
22
 In Amgen, the Court is specifically asked to decide 
whether proof of price distortion is necessary to obtain class certification.
23
 
This Article argues that the natural outgrowth of the Court’s market-based 
approach to securities fraud justifies resolving the tension in Amgen by 
overruling that aspect of the Basic decision which retains a reliance 
requirement. 
Part I of this Article places Halliburton in historical context, first by 
describing the decisions that preceded Basic and then by examining 
Basic’s adoption of the presumption of reliance. Part II examines the 
aftermath of Basic, including the Court’s subsequent decision in Dura. In 
Part III, the Article explains the collective impact of Basic and Dura—
specifically, the move to a market-based conception of securities fraud and 
the role of price distortion in that conception. Part IV positions 
 
 
 18. See Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC 
Rulemaking, SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164423 
(describing criticisms of SEC enforcement policies). 
 19. See Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011) (explaining that 
“loss causation is . . . not price impact” and that “we need not, and do not, address any other question 
about Basic, its presumption, or how and when it may be rebutted”). 
 20. As explained below, to distinguish between these concepts, this Article will term them “ex 
ante price distortion” and “ex post price distortion.” 
 21. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (observing that the district 
court must apply “a rigorous analysis” in determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 are 
satisfied (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982))). 
 22. See Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1085).  
 23. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Amgen, 660 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing 
questions presented). 
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Halliburton as the natural outgrowth of this conceptual tension and 
explains why Halliburton’s analysis of these issues was both correct and 
incorrect. Part V describes the evolution of the class certification analysis 
and explains how this evolution has complicated the Basic inquiry. Part VI 
suggests that the natural solution to this problem is to overrule Basic and 
reject a reliance requirement, and then briefly identifies the policy 
considerations implicit in this approach. 
I. BASIC AND ITS PAST 
A. Early Cases and Commentary 
Many commentators cite Basic as the foundation of modern securities 
fraud litigation.
24
 Basic did not reflect, however, a doctrinal shift.
25
 From 
the earliest cases addressing the implied private right of action under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
26
 and SEC Rule 10b-5, the 
lower courts recognized that it was impractical to impose a reliance 
requirement in federal securities fraud litigation.
27
 Commentators similarly 
questioned the theoretical premise for requiring proof of reliance.
28
 
The reliance requirement had its origins in common law fraud, which 
served as the initial source of the elements of federal securities fraud.
29
 
 
 
 24. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences By Investors 
and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 115 (1999) (describing Basic as “the most important Supreme Court 
decision to date on open market securities fraud”). 
 25. Cf. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 3, at 74 (describing Basic as “relaxing the reliance 
requirement”). 
 26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 27. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Carried to its logical end, 
[Wolf’s assertion of the need for proof of reliance] would negate any attempted class action under 
Rule 10b-5, since as the District Courts have recognized, reliance is an issue lurking in every 10b-5 
action.”). The first cases to address the role of reliance under the federal securities laws did so largely 
in the context of proxy fraud and tender offer litigation. See, e.g., Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 
U.S. 375 (1970). In those cases, the courts generally held, with little difficulty or discussion, that proof 
of materiality was sufficient without independent proof that the misrepresentation or omission would 
have had a decisive effect on the outcome. As the Supreme Court explained: “Proof of actual reliance 
by thousands of individuals would, as the [lower] court acknowledged, not be feasible . . . .” Id. at 382 
n.5. 
 28. See, e.g., Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 584, 590 (1975) [hereinafter Note, The Reliance Requirement]; see also Brief for Amici 
Curiae Civil Procedure and Securities Law Professors in Support of Respondent at 4, Amgen Inc. v. 
Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, No. 11-1085 (Sept. 27, 2012) (arguing that framers of Rule 23 
intended to facilitate securities fraud class actions). 
 29. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462–63 (2d Cir. 1965) (describing 
incorporation of common law requirements of materiality and reliance); cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744–45 (1975) (“[T]he typical fact situation in which the classic 
tort of misrepresentation and deceit evolved was light years away from the world of commercial 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss3/8
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Common law fraud included a requirement that plaintiffs prove subjective 
reliance.
30
 As one court explained it, the test was “whether [an individual] 
plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if 
the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact.”
31
 
Courts promptly began to question whether it was appropriate to apply 
the reliance requirement to federal securities fraud. The reliance 
requirement appeared anomalous for several reasons. The issue arose 
initially in the early securities fraud cases involving non-disclosure or 
omission.
32
 Proof of reliance in a non-disclosure case essentially required a 
counterfactual analysis. As a student commentator explained in a Harvard 
Law Review note: “Since nothing is affirmatively represented in a 
nondisclosure case, demanding proof of reliance would require the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that he had in mind the converse of the omitted 
facts, which would be virtually impossible to demonstrate in most 
cases.”
33
 
Second, and more generally, the entire mandatory disclosure system of 
federal securities regulation was based on the premise that information 
affects trading and market prices. As the Second Circuit explained in 
1968, “It is reasonable to assume that investors may very well rely on the 
material contained in false corporate financial statements which have been 
disseminated in the market place, and in so relying may subsequently 
purchase securities of the corporation.”
34
 
Third, an individualized reliance inquiry became more complicated in 
the context of impersonal transactions in the public markets. Plaintiffs in 
public market transactions were exposed to a range of information from a 
variety of sources. Defendants often released a mixture of information in 
multiple public statements. Market intermediaries—including analysts, 
brokers, and the financial media—processed that information and 
communicated their conclusions to investors who, in many cases, did not 
 
 
transactions to which 10b-5 is applicable.”). The basic elements required to establish a claim of federal 
securities fraud are: “(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state 
of mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance . . . ; (5) economic loss; 
and (6) ‘loss causation,’ i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.” 
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 
 30. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (“With regard to the 
element of reliance, although there is dicta to the contrary, this element appears to be indispensable to 
the cause of action upon either theory . . . . Absent proof of reliance, there is no liability.”). 
 31. List, 340 F.2d at 463. 
 32. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735–37 (8th Cir. 1967); Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 
387, 392–95 (E.D. La. 1970). 
 33. Note, The Reliance Requirement, supra note 28, at 590. 
 34. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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review the issuer’s original statements.
35
 In addition, the contextual nature 
of financial information meant that its role in an investor’s decision might 
vary depending on the other information that was currently available in the 
market.  
The limitations of the litigation process as a means of uncovering 
reliable evidence of reliance was an additional consideration. Evidence of 
reliance is largely limited to plaintiffs’ testimony about what they saw and 
thought. A legal system that requires proof of subjective reliance may 
generate self-serving testimony.
36
 In impersonal market trading, reliable 
evidence of the specific factors that influenced the parties’ decisions to 
trade is unlikely to exist. 
The class action context heightened these concerns. Not only was the 
inquiry into subjective reliance difficult with respect to any specific 
investor, but each investor’s reliance inquiry in a class action might 
involve different factors. At the same time, the 1966 amendments to Rule 
23
37
 suggested that the Rule was intended to allow securities fraud 
litigation to proceed in the form of a class action.
38
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a determination of materiality in 
a securities fraud case was, implicitly, a determination that the 
misinformation had the capacity to affect transactions and prices.
39
 
 
 
 35. Commentators increasingly recognized that investors rarely read even statutorily-mandated 
disclosures. See, e.g., HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN 
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 14–15 (1979) (discussing the widely-held belief that prospectuses are typically 
not read). In addition, because investors often relied on information intermediaries, it was difficult to 
trace the causal chain through those intermediaries. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 
1981); Robert B. Thompson, Federal Corporate Law: Torts and Fiduciary Duty, 31 J. CORP. L. 877, 
880 (2006) (explaining that most investors receive information through “one or more filters or 
intermediaries”). 
 36. As the court noted in Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 
Prices of even poorly followed stocks change in response to news, including statements by 
the issuers, and these changes may be better indicators of causation than litigants’ self-serving 
statements about what they read and relied on and about what they would have paid (or 
whether they would have bought at all) had the issuer said something different. 
8 F.3d 1121, 1130 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (Advisory Committee’s notes on the 1966 amendments). 
 38. See, e.g., Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 
1214 (1966) (describing how the “complete overhaul of rule 23 significantly expand[ed] the scope of 
class actions”). This led courts simply to assume, with limited discussion, that the reliance requirement 
could not pose an obstacle to class certification. See, e.g., Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 
41 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (“The defendants’ contentions that the proof of reliance and use of 
the mails must relate to each individual member of the class presents no difficulty not inherent in every 
securities class action.”). For a more extensive analysis of the appropriateness of the private securities 
fraud class action, see Judge Weinstein’s opinion in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 
1968). 
 39. Where the transaction is accomplished through impersonal dealings, such as on a stock 
exchange, or for some other reason the factors that influenced the parties are not readily apparent, the 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss3/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013] THE TROUBLE WITH BASIC 903 
 
 
 
 
Although establishing materiality did not prove that, but for the fraud, the 
transaction would not have occurred, it arguably established that any 
transaction that did occur would have occurred on different terms in the 
absence of the fraud. In the context of a regulatory scheme designed to 
protect the efficiency of the capital markets, the imposition of liability for 
injecting into the market misinformation that had the capacity to distort 
prices appeared consistent with the statutory objectives. 
Courts varied in the degree to which they attempted to devise 
pragmatic solutions to the complexity of proving reliance as opposed to 
modifying or eliminating the common law requirement. Because, at that 
time, private litigation under Rule 10b-5 was relatively new, many courts 
simply reserved decision on the question of whether the plaintiff was 
required to prove reliance.
40
 When they did consider the reliance 
requirement, courts used a variety of mechanisms to avoid requiring direct 
proof of reliance. As the Second Circuit explained: 
In fraud or 10b-5 cases decided in recent years, various rules, 
mechanisms, or presumptions have been put forward for mitigating 
the problem of showing reliance: Split trials for individual proof on 
reliance; inferring from the materiality of the misstatement that a 
reasonable investor would have relied; stressing general reliance on 
a common course of conduct over a period of time; dispensing with 
or minimizing the need to prove individual reliance in cases of 
nondisclosure; using the test, in instances of omission, of whether 
the claimant would have been influenced to act differently, if the 
undisclosed fact had been made known, than he in fact did.
41
 
 
 
decisions have discussed liability in terms of constructive reliance premised on the materiality of the 
misrepresentation. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173–74 (3d Cir. 1970); Heit, 402 F.2d at 
912; List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462–64 (1965). “This constructive reliance principle is 
particularly appropriate in class actions where proof of actual reliance by numerous class members 
would be impracticable.” Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 374 (2d Cir. 1973); 
see also Kahan, 424 F.2d at 174. 
 40. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Even if Wolf is correct in 
its assertion of the need for proof of reliance, and we express no views on that issue, we must still 
reject the argument.”) (emphasis added); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (“The 
parties are at odds over the issue of the kind and degree of reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. 
. . . At this juncture, I need not . . . rule on this question.”). 
 41. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1212–13 (2d Cir. 1972) (internal citations omitted). 
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B. Ute—Reliance in Omission Cases 
The Supreme Court dealt a setback to lower court experimentation with 
ways to avoid requiring direct proof of reliance with its decision in Ute.
42
 
Ute was decided just one year after the Supreme Court first formally 
acknowledged the existence of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5
43
 
and sixteen years before its decision in Basic. Rather than concluding, for 
any of the reasons noted above, that a reliance requirement was anomalous 
within the context of federal securities fraud litigation, the Court in Ute 
reaffirmed that reliance was, in fact, a required component of a 10b-5 
claim.
44
 Nonetheless, the Court held that, within the context of the case-
specific facts before it, affirmative proof of reliance was not required.
45
 
Ute did not involve anonymous transactions in the public markets
46
—it 
involved individualized face-to-face transactions between eighty-five 
plaintiff-sellers and the individual defendants.
47
 In some cases, the 
defendants purchased the plaintiffs’ shares for their own accounts; in 
others, they facilitated transactions for third-party buyers, for which they 
received commissions.
48
 The defendants did not make any public 
statements, the litigation was not brought as a class action, and the 
decisions involved an appeal after a full trial, not the resolution of a 
motion for class certification.
49
 Accordingly, many of the considerations 
that affected the lower court decisions were not present in Ute. 
The Tenth Circuit found that, although several of the transactions 
involved affirmative misrepresentations by the defendants as to the 
prevailing market price, the record did not contain any evidence as to 
reliance, and that proof of reliance was required.
50
 In addition, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the defendants were only liable with respect to 
transactions conducted for their personal accounts.
51
 The Supreme Court 
 
 
 42. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–54 (1972). 
 43. See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). 
 44. Ute, 406 U.S. at 152–53. 
 45. Id. at 153–54. 
 46. Nor could the market for the stock in Ute have been characterized as efficient. See id. at 155 
(describing the market as being “so isolated and so thin”). 
 47. Id. at 144. 
 48. Id. at 152. 
 49. See id. at 139–50. 
 50. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir. 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). This finding was 
somewhat anomalous in that the court, three paragraphs earlier, stated, “The record shows that the 
plaintiffs considered these defendants to be familiar with the market for the shares of stock and relied 
upon them when they desired to sell their shares.” Id. at 1347. 
 51. Id. at 1345–46. 
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disagreed with both conclusions.
52
 Specifically, the Court concluded that 
the defendants had not merely made misrepresentations (in violation of 
Rule10b-5(2)), but had engaged in a course of business that operated as a 
fraud—operating as, in effect, marketmakers with respect to the securities 
in question.
53
 As a result, the Court concluded that the defendants owed 
the plaintiffs an affirmative duty of disclosure.
54
 The Court then held that 
independent proof of reliance was not required: “All that is necessary is 
that the facts withheld be material . . . .”
55
 The link between materiality 
might be viewed as establishing a type of objective reliance (whether a 
reasonable investor would rely) as opposed to subjective reliance (whether 
the specific plaintiffs did, in fact, rely), although the Court did not offer 
that characterization.
56
 As the Court stated, the defendants’ actions 
“reasonably could have been expected to influence [the plaintiffs’] 
decisions to sell.”
57
 
Despite this reasoning, the Court did not state that objective reliance 
was sufficient to establish 10b-5 liability.
58
 Ute’s legacy was narrow. As 
the Court explained, “Under the circumstances of this case, involving 
primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a 
prerequisite to recovery.”
59
 
The Ute decision is somewhat anomalous. It appears unlikely that the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ute to address the reliance 
requirement in federal securities fraud. The case, as mentioned above, 
does not present the impersonal capital markets type of transaction that 
was causing the most difficulty in the lower courts. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion addressed novel issues concerning sovereign 
immunity and the interpretation of the statutory scheme for allocation of 
Indian mineral rights.
60
 In addition, the factual record in Ute is somewhat 
unclear. Although the Supreme Court characterized the case as one 
primarily involving omissions, for example, as noted above, the Tenth 
Circuit found that “the record shows that the individual defendants made a 
misstatement of a material fact in representing, in those instances wherein 
 
 
 52. Ute, 406 U.S. at 153–54. 
 53. Id. at 153. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. This distinction becomes important in the context of class certification. 
 57. Id. 
 58. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., the Supreme Court held that similar proof of objective 
reliance was sufficient to establish causation in a claim for federal proxy fraud. 396 U.S. 375, 385 
(1970). 
 59. Ute, 406 U.S. at 153. 
 60. See, e.g., id. at 141–43. 
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they purchased stock for sale at a personal profit, that the prevailing price 
or market price was the figure at which their own purchase was made.”
61
 
Thus the Ute opinion did not explicitly signal the broader implications of 
the Court’s holding for the reliance requirement. 
The application of Ute created questions for the lower courts. 
Specifically, although the Supreme Court did not use the term 
“presumption,” the lower courts, virtually without exception, concluded 
that Ute established only a presumption of reliance
62
—a presumption that 
might be rebutted under appropriate circumstances. Because it did not 
speak to the issue, Ute’s language did not offer guidance as to what those 
circumstances might be.
63
 In addition, the lower courts relied on the 
Supreme Court’s characterization of the facts to conclude that Ute applied 
only to omission cases.
64
 The courts reasoned that proof of subjective 
reliance was difficult in an omission case because of the challenge in 
demonstrating reliance on information that was not provided.
65
 Again, this 
analysis was not contained in the Ute decision itself. 
The counterfactual nature of the reliance inquiry is not, however, 
limited to omissions cases, but extends to misrepresentation cases as well. 
In addition, as noted above, there were a number of challenges to 
establishing subjective reliance in impersonal public market transactions.
66
 
The lower courts responded by going beyond Ute’s holding
67
 to create an 
 
 
 61. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1347 (10th Cir. 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).  
 62. “Courts applying Affiliated Ute have doctrinally invoked a rebuttable presumption of reliance 
based on proof of materiality in cases alleging deception by non-disclosure of information.” Finkel v. 
Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1987). But see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 400 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ute did not create a presumption but held that 
reasonable reliance was established “as a matter of law” on the basis of materiality). 
 63. See, e.g., Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978) (“If defendant can prove that 
plaintiff did not rely, that is, that plaintiff’s decision would not have been affected even if defendant 
had disclosed the omitted facts, then plaintiff's recovery is barred.”). 
 64. Id. (citing cases indicating a general pattern of limiting Ute to omissions cases). 
 65. See, e.g., Vervaecke v. Chiles Heider, & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting the 
“difficulty of proving reliance on the negative” (quoting Note, The Reliance Requirement, supra note 
28, at 590). 
 66. Dispensing with subjective reliance can be justified on the ground that, in the impersonal 
capital markets, with extensive sources of information, trading strategies, and investor types, the extent 
to which a single factor affected an investor’s decision to trade is largely unknowable. See Note, The 
Reliance Requirement, supra note 28, at 594 (arguing for extension of Ute to “deception affecting 
market conditions”). “In such cases the difficulty of proving reliance and the probative value of 
materiality justify placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant once the plaintiff can establish 
that there was a material misrepresentation or omission.” Id. at 606. 
 67. Courts initially took this step in cases involving proxy fraud and tender offer fraud, reasoning 
that, as with omission cases, it was simply too difficult to require proof that, absent the 
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alternative mechanism by which plaintiffs could avoid the requirement of 
demonstrating subjective reliance—the “fraud on the market theory.”
68
 
FOTM developed as an aggregation of several strains of reasoning. The 
first court to use the “fraud on the market” terminology was the Southern 
District of New York in Herbst v. Able.
69
 There the court explained that 
the effect of the defendant’s fraud was to distort market price and that this 
distortion, in turn, induced reliance by the plaintiffs.
70
 To some degree, 
this approach was similar to that of constructive reliance.
71
 
In Blackie v. Barrack,
72
 the earliest Court of Appeals decision to adopt 
FOTM, the Ninth Circuit explained that: “We think causation is 
adequately established in the impersonal stock exchange context by proof 
of purchase and of the materiality of misrepresentations, without direct 
proof of reliance.”
73
 The court explained that the reliance requirement 
“imposes an unreasonable and irrelevant evidentiary burden.”
74
 Critically, 
Blackie established the rationale upon which the Supreme Court would 
come to rely in Basic. As the court explained, whether or not an investor 
relies directly on a specific false statement, “he relies generally on the 
supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected 
manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the 
truth of the representations underlying the stock price—whether he is 
aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations.”
75
 
The Second Circuit took a somewhat different approach to FOTM in 
Panzirer v. Wolf.
76
 In that case, the plaintiff, Panzirer, alleged an indirect 
chain of causation in which the defendants’ misrepresentations contributed 
to the inclusion of the subject securities in a Wall Street Journal article
 
 
misrepresentation, the plaintiffs would have acted differently. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air 
Brake Co. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 68. Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“If plaintiffs can prevail in their ‘fraud on 
the market’ theory, this may be sufficient to sustain a recovery under Section 10(b) . . . .”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (“The relevant impact of the misrepresentations was on the market. It was the artificially 
heightened market price, pure and simple, which operated on plaintiffs and other members of the class 
to induce conversion.” (quoting plaintiffs’ brief)). 
 71. Courts adopted the constructive reliance approach, which held that reliance followed upon a 
showing of materiality, for federal proxy and tender offer fraud. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 
U.S. 375 (1970) (adopting a rule of constructive reliance); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 374 (2d Cir. 1973) (terming this approach “constructive reliance”). 
 72. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 73. Id. at 906. 
 74. Id. at 907. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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upon which she relied.
77
 Terming the claim one of “secondary reliance,”
78
 
the court found Panzirer’s allegations sufficient.
79
 “Where the plaintiff acts 
upon information from those working in or reporting on the securities 
markets, and where that information is circulated after a material 
misrepresentation or omission, plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim of 
reliance on the misrepresentation or omission.”
80
 
Arguably, the most extreme approach was taken by the Fifth Circuit in 
Shores v. Sklar.
81
 Rejecting the trial court’s holding that fraud on the 
market was limited to open market transactions, the Fifth Circuit held that 
allegations that the defendant’s fraud allowed the bonds in question to be 
marketed were sufficient to establish causation.
82
 Terming its “fraud 
created the market” approach “very similar to the fraud-on-the-market 
theory,”
83
 the Fifth Circuit held that allegations of subjective reliance on 
the offering documents were not required because, if the plaintiffs’ 
allegations were true, the securities would never have been marketed.
84
 
Importantly, the lower court cases that employed fraud on the market 
or some variation thereof, all converted the common law subjective 
reliance requirement into one of objective reliance or what some courts 
termed causation. Proof that a particular plaintiff would have behaved 
differently in the absence of the fraud was simply unnecessary. As the 
Court stated in Blackie, “proof of subjective reliance on particular 
misrepresentations is unnecessary to establish a 10b-5 claim for a 
deception inflating the price of stock traded in the open market.”
85
 
C. Basic Itself 
Although lower court decisions varied in both their reasoning and their 
expansiveness, by the time of the Basic decision, FOTM was well-
established. As Donald Langevoort states: “all courts of appeals that had 
considered the question had invoked some kind of reliance presumption in 
order to make fraud-on-the-market class-action lawsuits certifiable.”
86
 
Daniel Fischel, who would eventually become a highly influential 
 
 
 77. Id. at 366. 
 78. Id. at 367. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 610 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1980), aff’d en banc, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 82. Id. at 240. 
 83. Id. at 239. 
 84. Id. at 240. 
 85. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 86. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 153. 
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professor and Dean at the University of Chicago Law School, published an 
article in 1982 arguing that fraud on the market was supported by 
prevailing understandings of economics and finance and that it offered a 
more coherent approach to securities fraud litigation than the traditional 
approach.
87
 As Fischel explained, “Because the rational course for 
investors is simply to accept the market price, it is of no consequence 
whether a plaintiff can demonstrate that he relied upon a particular piece 
of information.”
88
 
At that time, however, the Supreme Court was in the process of 
retreating from its earlier expansionist approach to private securities fraud 
litigation.
89
 In a series of decisions outside the reliance context, the 
Supreme Court read the requirements of a securities fraud restrictively 
and, in some cases, warned of the dangers of an expanding private cause 
of action.
90
 
In that context, the Supreme Court decided Basic. At the outset, the 
Court expressly reaffirmed the continued vitality of the reliance 
requirement, stating, “We agree that reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5 
cause of action.”
91
 The Court then explained that its version of FOTM was 
simply a way of demonstrating reliance in the context of open market 
transactions.
92
 In the stock market, the Court explained, investors 
justifiably rely on the market as their agent, to price their securities.
93
 
Because investors reasonably rely on the integrity of market price, it may 
be presumed that they rely on misrepresentations that distort that market 
price.
94
 Reliance on market price offered a practical substitute for direct 
proof of reliance on the defendants’ statements. 
The Basic decision stated that the “threshold facts for”
95
 establishing 
FOTM were a showing that the defendants “made public, material 
misrepresentations and [respondents] sold Basic stock in an impersonal, 
efficient market.”
96
 In a footnote that has subsequently generated 
 
 
 87. Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving 
Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1 (1982). 
 88. Id. at 8. 
 89. See Jayne W. Barnard, The Supreme Court and the Shareholder Litigant: Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson in Context, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 985 (1989) (recounting the Supreme Court’s conservative trend 
in its securities fraud decisions leading up to Basic). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). 
 92. Id. at 247–48. 
 93. Id. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980). 
 94. Id. at 247. 
 95. Id. at 248. 
 96. Id. 
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disagreement in the lower courts,
97
 the opinion further noted that the lower 
court held that, in order to invoke the presumption, the plaintiffs must 
allege and prove:  
(1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) that the 
misrepresentations were material; (3) that the shares were traded on 
an efficient market; (4) that the misrepresentations would induce a 
reasonable, relying investor to misjudge the value of the shares; and 
(5) that the plaintiff traded the shares between the time the 
misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed.
98
 
Importantly, the Basic presumption was rebuttable. As the Court 
explained, the presumption could be rebutted by “[a]ny showing that 
severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price 
received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market 
price . . . .”
99
 This last statement was critical in that it retained both the 
subjective and objective components of the reliance requirement. 
Basic explicitly justified its presumption in terms of policy 
considerations, explaining that presumptions are widely used in 
circumstances in which direct proof is difficult to produce. The Court 
noted that its decision was supported by “considerations of fairness, public 
policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy.”
100
 
In light of its history and the prevailing reasoning in the lower courts, 
Basic is properly understood not as a revolution, but a retrenchment. The 
Supreme Court could have eliminated the requirement that plaintiffs 
establish reliance in 10b-5 cases.
101
 Alternatively, the Court could have 
held that proof of causation was sufficient to establish reliance.
102
 Basic 
could have extended Ute’s holding to include misrepresentation cases by 
holding that proof of materiality was sufficient to establish reliance.
103
 
Finally, the Court could have rejected the claim that subjective reliance—
the motivation for individual plaintiff decisions—was a required element 
of 10b-5 liability. The Court did none of these. Basic reaffirmed the need 
for an inquiry into reliance and, importantly, preserved this inquiry for a 
 
 
 97. See, e.g., Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 
2011) (criticizing other courts for “misread[ing] the Basic footnote”). 
 98. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27. 
 99. Id. at 248. 
 100. Id. at 245. 
 101. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 153.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Indeed, this approach would have been analogous to the manner in which the Court had 
previously addressed proxy fraud. See supra note 27. 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss3/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013] THE TROUBLE WITH BASIC 911 
 
 
 
 
threshold stage of the litigation—the class certification decision. 
Subsequent developments in doctrines of civil procedure have given new 
significance to this approach. 
II. AFTER BASIC 
A. Reliance Analysis After Basic 
As indicated above, Basic’s language appears to contemplate a 
continued role for subjective reliance. At least some members of the Basic 
plurality likely intended lower courts to continue to examine both market 
effects (objective reliance) and individual investor decisions (subjective 
reliance). Attempts by litigants in the lower courts to rebut or overcome 
Basic’s presumption, however, largely focused on objective reliance.
104
 
The dominant form of challenges to class certification, post-Basic, was to 
challenge the efficiency of the market in which the securities traded.
105
 
Lower courts responded to these challenges by developing an elaborate 
test for analyzing market efficiency.
106
 
 
 
 104. Cf. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 300–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting 
defendants’ argument that because some named plaintiffs were passive indexed investors, Basic’s 
presumption of reliance should not apply). It is unclear why Basic did not lead defendants to bring 
more challenges to subjective reliance. One possible answer is that defeating market efficiency would 
result in dismissal, while knocking out some plaintiffs would not. See Barnard, supra note 89, at 1021 
(observing that resourceful plaintiffs’ attorneys can readily find substitute class representatives). 
 105. See, e.g., Allen Michel, et al., Fraud-on-the-Market Theory: Is a Market Efficient?, 24 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 58 (2005) (“The key to satisfying the reliance requirement in a fraud-on-the-market 
case is the demonstration that the securities market on which the security in question trades is 
efficient.”); William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of 
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 852 (2005) (“This mechanical notion of an ‘efficient market’ has come 
to dominate securities litigation.”). The focus on analyzing the extent to which the market was 
“sufficiently” efficient developed despite Basic’s statement that “[f]or purposes of accepting the 
presumption of reliance in this case, we need only believe that market professionals generally consider 
most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.” 
Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n.24. 
 106. One of the most frequently cited cases for the evaluation of market efficiency is Cammer v. 
Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989). The court in Cammer cited five factors that should be 
considered in determining whether the security traded in a sufficiently efficient market for purposes of 
the Basic presumption: (1) the stock’s “average weekly trading volume”; (2) the “number of securities 
analysts” who follow the stock; (3) the “existence of market makers and arbitrageurs” active in the 
stock; (4) eligibility to file an SEC Form S-3 registration statement; and (5) a showing that the stock 
price responded to “unexpected corporate events or financial releases.” Id. at 1286–87; see also 
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Proving Markets Inefficient: The Variability of Federal Court Decisions 
on Market Efficiency in Cammer v. Bloom and its Progeny, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 303 (2002) 
(discussing Cammer decision and subsequent reliance on factors discussed therein); David Tabak, Do 
Courts Count Cammer Factors?, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.nera 
.com/nera-files/pub_cammer_factors_0812.pdf (finding that, in an empirical analysis of decisions on 
market efficiency, courts appear to count the Cammer factors). 
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Basic’s emphasis on market efficiency left its analysis open to 
criticism.
107
 As Macey and Miller demonstrate, the Basic Court did not 
fully articulate the conception of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis 
(“ECMH”) upon which it relied or the theoretical foundations of its 
opinion.
108
 Because there are variations in economic theories of 
efficiency,
109
 Basic’s analysis led to difficulties in applying FOTM.
110
 
Perhaps the most substantial criticism was that Basic’s presumption 
required markets to be fundamental value efficient in a way that 
subsequent empirical studies have demonstrated they are not.
111
 
Fundamental value efficiency means that securities’ prices reflect the 
securities’ fundamental values.
112
 Few scholars believe that the public 
capital markets are fundamental value efficient.
113
 Information efficiency, 
in contrast, means that securities prices rapidly incorporate publicly 
available information.
114
 Most scholars believe that the markets are 
information efficient to some degree.
115
 
Even if Basic only requires information efficiency, critics have 
questioned the extent of that efficiency and, as a result, the validity of 
assuming that information distorts stock prices.
116
 For example, 
 
 
 107. See, e.g., Carol R. Goforth, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis—An Inadequate 
Justification For the Fraud-On-The-Market Presumption, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 895, 902 (1992). 
 108. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the 
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1077–79 (1990). 
 109. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, 
Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991) 
(“[S]ubstantial disagreement exists about to what degree markets are efficient, how to test for 
efficiency, and even the definition of efficiency.”). 
 110. See, e.g., L. Brett Lockwood, Comment, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory: A Contrarian 
View, 38 EMORY L.J. 1269, 1302 (1989) (arguing that “efficient market theory is subject to too many 
reservations to be an adequate foundation for the fraud-on-the-market theory”). 
 111. Id. at 1302–11; see also In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 271–72 (D. 
Mass. 2006). 
 112. See Robert G. Newkirk, Comment, Sufficient Efficiency: Fraud on the Market in the Initial 
Public Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1393, 1398–99 (1991) (explaining the difference between 
information efficiency and fundamental value efficiency). 
 113. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental 
Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986) (citing evidence indicating the absence of fundamental value 
efficiency); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and 
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 649 (1995) (noting scholars’ “[i]ncreasing disillusionment 
with the concept of fundamental value efficiency”). 
 114. Newkirk, supra note 112, at 1396–97. 
 115. See, e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 59 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Foreword: Revisiting Gilson and Kraakman's Efficiency 
Story, 28 J. CORP. L. 499 (2003).  
 116. See generally Paul A. Ferrillo et al., The “Less Than” Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis: 
Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 107–
16 (2004) (identifying various challenges to the efficient market hypothesis). The plurality in Basic 
recognized the potential flaw in its analysis, noting that there might be an incongruity between its 
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commentators have questioned the claim that markets react 
instantaneously to information, pointing to numerous examples of long-
term price distortions.
117
 Similarly, markets may systematically overreact 
or underreact to different types of information.
118
 Other commentators 
have suggested that developments in behavioral economics undercut the 
claim that traders rely on expectations of price or market integrity.
119
 
A strong version of market efficiency should not, however, be a 
predicate for application of the Basic presumption. The connection that the 
Basic decision identified between fraud and stock price depends only on 
the weakest conception of market efficiency—the premise that information 
affects securities prices.
120
 Prices need not respond accurately, 
instantaneously, or rapidly to information to justify the claim that, if the 
market contains misinformation, securities trades are likely to occur at 
different prices than in a market free from fraud.
121
 Price distortion, not 
market efficiency, is, in reality, the core concept on which the Basic’s 
reasoning depends. 
Importantly, however, when fraud distorts securities prices, it produces 
a market-based harm. In the presence of a price distortion, all investors 
trade at the wrong price. Wrong, as used here, does not depend on notions 
of fundamental value—it simply means that the price is different from 
what it would have been in the absence of misinformation. The injury 
 
 
description of the trading market for Basic stock and the allegation that the price of Basic shares could 
remain distorted for fourteen months on the basis of three public statements. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 249 n.29 (1988). 
 117. E.g., Goforth, supra note 107, at 902–903. 
 118. See, e.g., Paul C. Tetlock, All the News That's Fit to Reprint: Do Investors React to Stale 
Information?, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1481 (2011) (showing that markets overreact to stale information); 
Timm O. Sprenger & Isabell M. Welpe, News Or Noise? The Stock Market Reaction to Different 
Types of Company-Specific News Events 4 (Jan. 20, 2011) (Working Paper), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=1734632 (finding that “the market reaction differs substantially across various types of 
news events”); Navin Chopra et al., Measuring Abnormal Performance: Do Stocks Overreact?, 31 J. 
FIN. ECON. 235 (1992). 
 119. See, e.g., In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 272 n.10 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(“The emerging field of behavioral finance suggests that differing investor assessments of value appear 
to be the rule, rather than the exception. Because the notion of information efficiency upon which the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption rests is crumbling under sustained academic scrutiny, the future of 
securities fraud class action litigation—dependent on this presumption—may be in jeopardy.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 120. Indeed, misinformation does not require an efficient market to distort prices; it has a 
distorting effect even in individualized face-to-face transactions. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, COUNCIL DRAFT NO. 1 § 11(a), at 60–64 (2012) 
(proposing price adjustment as remedy for negligent misrepresentations in insurance contracts). 
 121. Note that this principle does not apply to all securities transactions. The manner in which 
prices are set in the IPO market, for example (underwriters, under-pricing) may lead to the conclusion 
that such prices are not affected by the presence of misinformation. 
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created by a distorted price is common to all investors regardless of their 
individualized reasons for trading, which is why it satisfies the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23.
122
 The solution has a price, however. 
A focus on price distortion shifts the focus of a 10b-5 claim from 
protecting the autonomy of the investment decision to protecting the 
ability to trade at a price undistorted by fraud. 
This then reveals an internal tension in Basic’s analysis. To the extent 
that misinformation distorts securities prices, it affects all market 
participants regardless of their reasons for trading. The premise of the 
reliance requirement, however, is the effect of the fraud on trading 
decisions. Reliance is required precisely because the common law 
perceives fraud as transaction-based and views the defendants’ 
misrepresentations as compromising the autonomy of investor decision-
making. 
B. Dura 
To satisfy Basic, plaintiffs needed to allege that they traded at a 
distorted (typically an artificially inflated) stock price.
123
 The Basic court 
did not, however, explain the legal significance of this price distortion. In 
Dura,
124
 the Court addressed that issue further. Dura involved an analysis 
of loss causation, which lower courts had distinguished from reliance, 
analogizing it to common law proximate cause.
125
 Congress codified the 
loss causation requirement in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995,
126
 although it did not define loss causation in the statute. 
The Dura plaintiffs attempted to establish loss causation by 
demonstrating that, at the time of their purchase, Dura’s stock had been 
artificially inflated due to the defendants’ misrepresentations.
127
 
Essentially, plaintiffs’ argument was that they were harmed by overpaying 
for their stock. The Court in Dura rejected this claim, holding that reliance 
and loss causation were two distinct components of a federal securities 
 
 
 122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 123. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245–47 (1988). 
 124. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 125. See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 811, 820–22 (2009) (describing evolution of the loss causation requirement in federal securities 
fraud litigation). 
 126. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101(b), § 21D(b)(4), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(4) (2006)). 
 127. 544 U.S. at 339–40. The plaintiffs further argued that their damages consisted of their 
overpayment for the Dura stock. Id. 
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fraud claim and that plaintiffs could not establish economic harm simply 
through the price distortion reflected in Basic’s analysis.
128
 
Dura’s holding was limited to two principles. First, the plaintiffs must 
establish a causal connection between the defendant’s fraud and their 
economic harm.
129
 Second, an inflated purchase price is not, in itself, the 
equivalent of economic harm.
130
 According to the Dura Court, trading at a 
distorted price does not inevitably cause investors to experience economic 
harm.
131
 Price distortion only results in outcome harm if the investor does 
not subsequently recover the amount of the distortion.
132
 The easiest 
illustration, as noted by the Dura Court, is a case in which an investor 
purchases a security at a distorted price and then resells that security while 
the price remains distorted.
133
 Dura noted that even when the plaintiff 
subsequently sells at a lower price, the price drop may have resulted from 
factors unrelated to the fraud.
134
 
Dura’s gloss on Basic establishes that price distortion at the time of the 
plaintiffs’ purchase establishes the potential for, but not the actuality of, 
economic harm. Economic harm can only be determined by an analysis of 
whether there is price distortion at a second point in time—when the fraud 
is revealed to the market. This second type of price distortion, what might 
be termed “ex post” price distortion is, according to the Dura court, the 
measure of the plaintiff’s harm. Dura held that ex post price distortion, as 
demonstrated by the price reaction to the revelation of the fraud, was 
required to establish loss causation.
135
 Critically, by holding that 
overpayment itself was not a recoverable economic harm,
136
 Dura 
extended Basic’s market-based conception of securities fraud. Under 
Dura’s theory, the plaintiff’s economic loss is the amount of the original 
price distortion that remains in the stock until the corrective disclosure, as 
measured by the market’s response to the disclosure of the original 
misrepresentation.
137
 Dura rejected the effect of the fraud on investor 
autonomy as an actionable harm. 
 
 
 128. Id. at 346–47. 
 129. Id. at 345–46. 
 130. Id. at 347. 
 131. Id. at 342–43. 
 132. See Fisch, supra note 125, at 843 (explaining outcome harm). 
 133. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
 134. Id. at 342–43. 
 135. Id. at 344. 
 136. Id. at 342. 
 137. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 336 
(5th Cir. 2010) (inquiring as to whether the correction of the fraud affects the market price—in essence 
removing the price distortion and thereby causing the plaintiff’s losses). 
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRICE DISTORTION  
A. A Market-Based Approach 
Basic held that courts can presume that distorted prices affect investor 
decisions,
138
 but Dura rejected the effect of the fraud on those decisions as 
a basis for recovery, looking instead to the market’s reaction to the 
fraud.
139
 A market-based approach to 10b-5 liability leads to a dramatic 
shift in the conceptualization of the plaintiffs’ harm.
140
 Under a common 
law fraud theory, plaintiffs’ theory is that they would not have traded in 
the absence of the misrepresentation. Reliance supplies the causal link 
between the fraud and their decision to trade.
141
 
Under a market-based approach, plaintiffs are only deceived to the 
extent that their trades occur at a price different from what it would have 
been in the absence of fraud. They are not deceived into trading, but 
merely into trading at the wrong price. Notably, price distortion affects all 
investors, regardless of the subjective motivation for their trading 
decisions. Specifically, the fraud affects the terms on which all investors 
trade, including investors that trade for reasons wholly independent of the 
misrepresentations such as indexed investors, program traders, and short 
sellers. Indexed investors, for example, are forced to buy securities that are 
contained in the index; thus, a misrepresentation cannot be said to affect 
their trading decisions. Nonetheless, such investors pay a higher price for 
their “forced” purchases if management has fraudulently inflated the 
issuer’s earnings. 
A market-based approach also affects the proper calculation of 
damages. Under common law fraud, a plaintiff can claim recessionary, 
opportunity loss, or even expectation damages.
142
 These measures are 
inappropriate under Basic/Dura because the court presumes that plaintiff 
would have traded irrespective of the fraud. Plaintiff’s only damage, 
therefore, is a price adjustment. 
The facts of Basic illustrate the impact of shifting to a market-based 
approach. The plaintiffs in Basic claimed to have been misled by Basic’s 
denial of merger negotiations into prematurely selling their stock before 
the eventual announcement of the merger and the resulting spike in stock 
 
 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 96 and 98. 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 129–36. 
 140. The Court in Basic explicitly noted that its decision did not address the proper measure of 
damages. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 n.28 (1988). 
 141. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 142. See Fisch, supra note 125, at 821. 
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price.
143
 In the absence of the false denials, plaintiffs argued, they would 
have held onto their stock until the merger was announced.
144
 They were 
harmed to the extent of the difference between the price at which they sold 
and the price at which they could have sold once the merger was 
announced.
145
 
Under a price distortion theory, plaintiffs are only harmed by (at most) 
the extent of the price distortion. The harm effected by Basic’s lie was the 
difference between the price at which the plaintiffs sold and the price at 
which Basic’s stock would have traded had the true facts about Basic’s 
merger negotiations been revealed to the market.
146
 Because the 
negotiations were, by all accounts, still in a preliminary stage at the time 
of the Basic lies, it is fair to assume that this price difference would have 
been far less than under a reliance-based theory.
147
 Specifically, the value 
of Basic stock would have been affected only marginally by merger 
negotiations that were at a preliminary stage.
148
 
The foregoing analysis reveals the true extent to which the Basic 
decision reflected judicial conservatism. Basic’s theory authorizes courts 
to confine plaintiffs’ recovery to far more limited damages than would be 
available under a common law approach. Dura extends this perspective by 
holding that, although artificial price inflation may serve as a starting point 
for the damage inquiry, recoverable damages may be even less because of 
intervening events that reduce the stock price.
149
 In contrast, common law 
 
 
 143. Basic, 485 U.S. at 227–28. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that the acquirer’s 
original tender offer was “at a price substantially in excess of that at which the plaintiffs sold their 
shares”). 
 146. Cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States of Utah, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972) (stating that 
“the correct measure of damages . . . is the difference between the fair value of all that the mixed-
blood seller received and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no fraudulent 
conduct”). 
 147. As Adam Pritchard explains, Justice Blackmun recognized these competing theories of 
damages at the time of the Basic decision, but the Basic opinion does not resolve the issue. See A.C. 
Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities 
Class Action Reform, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 221 & n.16 (citing Letter from Harry A. 
Blackmun to William J. Brennan, Jr., No. 86-279, Basic v. Levinson (Jan. 15, 1988) (Thurgood 
Marshall Collection, Lib. of Congress)). Pritchard explains that Blackmun agreed to defer the damages 
question at the behest of Justice Stevens. Id. at 221. 
 148. Notably, Basic’s initial denial of the merger negotiations occurred fourteen months before the 
parties reached a deal. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228. 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 134. I have criticized Dura’s approach to intervening 
events elsewhere. See Fisch, supra note 125. 
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fraud would disregard the effect of intervening events on the stock price 
when a plaintiff was fraudulently induced into the transaction.
150
 
The normative appeal of the market-based approach is unclear, and a 
full examination of its effects is beyond the scope of this Article. The 
approach is likely both to expand the size of plaintiff classes and to reduce 
the damages that are recoverable by class members. The approach may be 
more consistent with the realities of securities market trading than the 
transaction-based approach, but, by ignoring investor behavior, it may 
create poor incentives. From a procedural perspective, however, the 
practicality of the market-based approach depends critically on the 
difficulty of establishing price distortion. The next section considers this 
issue. 
B. Empirical Analysis of Price Distortion 
Premising both the reliance and causation inquiries on price distortion 
generates the obvious question: how do the litigants establish price 
distortion? Economic theory suggests that the effect of a misrepresentation 
on stock prices should be ascertainable through empirical methods such as 
an event study.
151
 Indeed the feasibility of such analysis was a key factor 
in Fischel’s defense of the price distortion inquiry as a means of 
simplifying securities fraud litigation.
152
 Following Dura, courts have 
widely accepted the use of event studies to establish ex post price 
distortion or loss causation.
153
 Indeed, courts have frequently required an 
event study or similar empirical analysis.
154
 
 
 
 150. See id. at 842–43. 
 151. For an explanation of this use of the event study methodology, see Esther Bruegger & 
Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with Response Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 
11, 15–30 (2009). 
 152. See Fischel, supra note 87, at 17–19. 
 153. See, e.g., Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse First Bos., No. 02-
12146-NMG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4566, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2012) (“An event study is an 
accepted method of measuring the impact of alleged securities fraud on a stock price and often plays a 
‘pivotal’ role in proving loss causation and damages in a securities fraud case.”); FindWhat Investor 
Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1313 n.31 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The methodology of event studies 
has been sustained by many circuits”); Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement 
for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 BUS. 
LAW. 163, 166–67 (2007) (describing event study analysis as “a ubiquitous tool in assessing claims of 
loss causation”). 
 154. See Bricklayers, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4566, at *10; In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. 
Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 352, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (terming the event study “almost obligatory”); Jonah 
B. Gelbach et al., Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies, AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442222 (discussing use of 
event studies in securities fraud litigation).  
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Although event studies are used extensively, they are imperfect tools 
for measuring the effect of a disclosure on stock prices. First, their 
application presents a number of methodological challenges. The expert 
must focus on the correct event day, addressing the possibility that the 
information previously “leaked” into the market.
155
 The expert must 
choose an appropriate event window reflecting a reasonable time period 
for the market to react to the disclosure.
156
 The expert must identify 
potential confounding events—other industry or company-specific 
information released to the market unrelated to the fraud—and control for 
their impact.
157
 
The aggregation or bunching of information events creates a particular 
concern. Large public companies are subject to a large volume of 
company-related news, and a reliable event study must disaggregate the 
effects of all the different information events that could potentially affect 
the stock price during the event window, separating out those events 
related to the fraud from other events. As the court observed in 
Bricklayers, this creates a “herculean task” for the expert.
158
 The challenge 
is particularly great when managers disclose information in “bunches,” 
and some scholarship suggests that, in a variety of circumstances, 
managers will prefer to bunch corporate disclosures.
159
 
A simple example illustrates the problem of bunched or bundled 
disclosures. Suppose, hypothetically, that Apple falsely disclosed in July 
2006, that Steve Jobs was in perfect health, despite knowing that he had 
been diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. Six months later, at the 2007 
Macworld Expo, Jobs simultaneously announced the release of the iPhone 
and the corrective disclosure that he had pancreatic cancer and was 
 
 
 155. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law—Part I: Technique and 
Corporate Litigation 5–6 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Working Paper 
No. 259, 2001), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/lepp_papers/259 (explaining why the 
selection of the correct event date is “nontrivial”). Bradford Cornell and Gregory Morgan demonstrate 
how information leakage is likely to affect the results of an event study. See Bradford Cornell & R. 
Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 883, 905–10 (1990). 
 156. One tool for addressing leakage is to expand the size of the event window, but this has the 
effect of increasing the number of potentially confounding events. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta 
Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II—Empirical Studies and Corporate Law 18 (John M. Olin 
Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 260, 2001), available at http://dig 
italcommons.law.yale.edu/lepp_papers/260. 
 157. See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 541 F. Supp. 2d 546, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 158. Bricklayers, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4566, at *7. 
 159. See, e.g., Ronald A. Dye, Disclosure “Bunching,” 48 J. ACCT. RES. 489 (2010) (identifying 
various conditions in which disclosure bunching is optimal for managers). A related concern is that a 
company may deliberately manipulate the timing of its disclosures in an effort to minimize its potential 
liability. See Fisch, supra note 125, at 852. 
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expected to die within six months. Presumably the market would view the 
iPhone as good news
160
 and Jobs’s illness as bad news, but it is difficult to 
see how an expert could reliably disaggregate the effect of the two 
announcements on the share price of Apple stock. 
In addition to these standard methodological issues, event studies raise 
particular concerns when they are used in securities fraud litigation 
because they focus on a single firm and a single or small number of 
information events.
161
 Gelbach et al. show that the standard event study 
methodology produces a large number of errors when applied to a single 
firm and single event, unless the firm’s true distribution of excess returns 
is normal.
162
 Their results suggest “the presence of a potentially severe 
bias against finding an event effect.”
163
 According to the authors, “this 
suggests the potential for considerable anti-plaintiff bias in the context of 
securities litigation.”
164
 
Finally, courts using event studies have failed to recognize the 
significant difference between a study that demonstrates an empirical 
relationship between an information event and stock price and a so-called 
“null result.” An event study is far more reliable in proving a positive 
relationship than disproving one.
165
 That is, an event study seeks to 
identify a statistically significant correlation between an event and stock 
price; the study’s failure to identify such a correlation does not necessarily 
mean there is no relationship.
166
 A non-result is inconclusive and may be 
due to a number of factors including flaws in the study design or merely a 
 
 
 160. Indeed, Apple stock reacted dramatically to the announcement of the iPhone, reaching an all-
time high the following day. See Apple Media Events, WIKIPEDIA (July 29, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://en 
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_media_events. 
 161. The standard approach is to consider a sample of firms because the volatility of an individual 
firm’s stock returns increases the size of the standard error. Bhagat & Romano, supra note 155, at 8. 
See also id. at 10–11 (explaining that the “the statistical power with a sample of one is likely to be 
quite low.”). 
 162. Gelbach et al., supra note 154. 
 163. Id. at 20. 
 164. Id. at 21. 
 165. See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 134 (4th ed. 2003) (“If on the basis of a 
test of significance, say, the t test, we decide to ‘accept’ the null hypothesis, all we are saying is that on 
the basis of the sample evidence we have no reason to reject it; we are not saying that the null 
hypothesis is true beyond any doubt.”). 
 166. See id. at 127 (explaining that a result outside the confidence interval allows the researcher to 
reject the null hypothesis; if a result “falls within the . . . confidence interval, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis”). Importantly, however, a result within the confidence interval does not confirm the null 
hypothesis. Id. 
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lack of statistical power in the test.
167
 The limitations of the event study 
methodology for measuring the effect of a single event on a single firm 
compound the problem. 
The foregoing limitations do not mean that event studies are unreliable 
or should not be used, but merely that their results should be viewed with 
caution. Until better empirical tools are developed, event studies are likely 
to be a dominant evidentiary tool for addressing the loss causation analysis 
required by Dura.
168
 Nonetheless, their limitations should lead courts to 
treat litigant efforts to present their results as dispositive with a degree of 
caution.
169
 
The widespread use of event studies to determine whether there has 
been ex post price distortion for purposes of loss causation analysis raises 
the question of whether event studies are also appropriate in analyzing ex 
ante price distortion. In some cases, defendants have sought to introduce 
event studies to disprove ex ante price distortion in an effort to defeat class 
certification.
170
 
Ex ante price distortion, for purposes of the application of Basic, raises 
additional complications, however. In particular, not every material 
misrepresentation moves stock prices at the time it is conveyed to the 
market. Many instances of securities fraud involve attempts to avoid or 
delay disclosure of negative corporate developments such as a decline in 
earnings, problems with a product, and the like. The fraud may take the 
form of failing to disclose new developments or repeating overly positive 
disclosures from the past that are no longer accurate. Because the fraud 
merely confirms existing market expectations, it is unlikely to have any 
immediate effect on stock price.
171
 Misrepresentations that effectively 
confirm market expectations are, as Frank Torchio explains, 
 
 
 167. Id. Statistical power is the test’s ability to detect abnormal performance when it is present. 
See S.P. Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of Event Studies, 1 HANDBOOK CORP. FIN. 15 
(2007). 
 168. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005). 
 169. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role 
of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183 (2009) (arguing that 
courts are inappropriately giving events studies too great a role in resolving securities fraud litigation). 
 170. See Martis Alex & Michael W. Stocker, Role of the Event Study in Loss Causation Analysis, 
CORPORATE COUNSEL, (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202433177190 (describing defendants’ argument in In re Marsh & McLennan Securities Litigation, 
No. 04-cv-08144 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2006)). 
 171. See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., 554 F.3d 342, 349 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(observing that misrepresentations that confirm prior market expectations are unlikely to move stock 
prices); Alex & Stocker, supra note 170 (“If a misrepresentation or omission merely confirms market 
expectations, there will be no reactionary price impact.”). 
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“ubiquitous.”
172
 The absence of a contemporaneous price movement does 
not mean the fraud has not distorted prices. The amount of the price 
distortion cannot be demonstrated through an event study, however, and 
requires counterfactual analysis—the extent to which the market would 
have reacted if accurate disclosure had been made. 
The difficulty in applying the event study methodology to ex ante price 
distortion is that it creates the potential for litigants to seek to introduce 
event studies of ex post price distortion at the class certification stage. 
Plausibly, at least in some cases, a price response to a corrective disclosure 
could provide circumstantial evidence of ex ante price distortion, but there 
is no systematic relationship between ex ante and ex post price distortion. 
Specifically, ex ante and ex post price distortion involve market reactions 
to different information and typically occur months apart in time. 
First, as commentators have observed, the market may react differently 
to a corrective disclosure than to accurate statements in the absence of 
fraud, making the ex post price reaction a poor measure of the extent of 
the ex ante price distortion.
173
 Second, various factors may limit the 
reaction of the market to a corrective disclosure, including other corporate 
disclosures that precede or accompany the correction.
174
 As I have 
explained elsewhere, corporate officials may have an incentive to structure 
their disclosures in an attempt to minimize their market impact.
175
 Third, 
intervening corporate and market developments may change the impact of 
the fraudulent statements when they are subsequently disclosed, making 
the corrective disclosure more or less important to market price than it 
would have been at the initial fraud.
176
 Thus the failure of market prices to 
react to a corrective disclosure does not prove that prices were not 
distorted, ex ante, as a result of the fraud. 
 
 
 172. Frank Torchio, Proper Event Study Analysis in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 159, 165 
(2009). 
 173. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers to Remedies 
for Securities Fraud, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 88 (2012) (explaining why stock price drop in 
response to a corrective disclosure may be a poor measure of the amount of initial price inflation). 
 174. See, e.g., Jay W. Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss 
Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss Causation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1419 (2004) 
(providing an example of this scenario). 
 175. Fisch, supra note 125, at 852. 
 176. In the extreme case, an intervening event can so damage the company as to render the 
disclosure of the fraud irrelevant. Cf. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 163 A. 111, 114–15 (N.H. 
1932) (intervening effect of electrocution killed the plaintiff, rendering his fall from a girder irrelevant 
in causing him additional damage). 
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IV. HALLIBURTON 
The relationship between reliance and causation
177
—or between ex ante 
and ex post price distortion—forms the background to Halliburton.
178
 The 
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s decision
179
 is premised on the theory that 
Basic’s presumption of reliance can be rebutted by evidence that the 
alleged fraud did not distort the market.
180
 If the alleged fraud did not 
distort the market price, the integrity of the market was not 
compromised.
181
 
The Fifth Circuit went further in Halliburton, however. Reasoning that 
price distortion was required for both loss causation and reliance,
182
 the 
court appeared to view the two price distortion inquiries as equivalent. 
Specifically, the court stated first that the plaintiffs were required to 
establish so-called price impact at the class certification stage.
183
 The court 
then described this price impact as “loss causation.”
184
 
Ex ante and ex post price distortion are different, however, as the 
preceding Part of this Article has explained and as the Supreme Court 
held.
185
 Price distortion at the time of the initial representation is part of 
 
 
 177. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Stoneridge added to the conflation of these two concepts. See 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 160 (2008) (stating that “reliance is 
tied to causation, leading to the inquiry whether [suppliers’] deceptive acts were immediate or remote 
to the injury”). 
 178. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 179. Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund., Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 335 (5th 
Cir. 2010). 
 180. As the court explained in Oscar Private Equity Investments. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., the 
link can be severed by “publicly available information that the misrepresentation didn’t move the stock 
price.” 487 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 181. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Halliburton, 597 F.3d at 335. Other courts have faced this 
question as well. See, e.g., In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 638 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that 
Basic’s presumption can be rebutted by showing of no price impact at class certification stage); In re 
Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 485 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that defendants should 
have the opportunity to rebut the Basic presumption, at the class certification stage, by showing the 
absence of price impact). But see Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding 
that whether the false statements materially affected stock price is a merits question). 
 182. Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Halliburton, 597 F.3d at 335–36. 
 183. Id. at 335; see also Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2187 (explaining that “‘Price impact’ simply 
refers to the effect of a misrepresentation on a stock price”). 
 184. Id. The Fifth Circuit said, “Plaintiff must prove that the complained-of misrepresentation or 
omission ‘materially affected the market price of the security.’ In other words, Plaintiff must show that 
an alleged misstatement ‘actually moved the market.’ Thus, ‘we require plaintiffs to establish loss 
causation in order to trigger the [FOTM] presumption.’” Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Halliburton, 
597 F.3d at 335 (quoting Oscar, 487 F.3d at 265). That proof must be by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. After a detailed analysis of the proof, including expert testimony, the circuit court 
concluded that plaintiffs failed to adequately establish loss causation. Id. at 337. 
 185. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2186 (“Loss causation addresses a matter different from whether an 
investor relied on a misrepresentation, presumptively or otherwise, when buying or selling a stock.”). 
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the Basic analysis;
186
 price distortion at the time of the corrective 
disclosure is necessary under Dura.
187
 Where the Fifth Circuit went wrong 
was in conflating the two. 
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had the burden of establishing 
price impact at the class certification stage, an argument that the Supreme 
Court found unnecessary to consider.
188
 They went on to argue that 
plaintiffs could show price impact in one of two ways. 
They can show price inflation upon a misrepresentation, which, as 
this Court made clear in Dura, is not synonymous with loss 
causation. Or failing that—and they could not show that here 
because their own proof showed that none of the alleged 
misrepresentations moved the market. So, the alternative way to 
show price impact is simply to show a price decline following a 
corrective disclosure.
189
 
This argument is misconceived. As previously explained, the failure of 
market prices to move in response to a misrepresentation does not 
establish the absence of a price distortion, particularly in cases when the 
misstatement fraudulently conceals a change in the status quo. Similarly, 
and consistent with Dura, ex ante price distortion is not the same as ex 
post price distortion, and the failure of prices to respond to a corrective 
disclosure does not sever the link between the defendants’ 
misrepresentation and a price distortion at the time that misrepresentation 
was made.
190
 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Halliburton may seem overly 
technical. If a plaintiff must, in the end, establish both ex ante and ex post 
price distortion, what difference does it make if the price distortion 
analysis is framed in terms of loss causation or not? The answer stems 
from Basic’s proceduralist foundations. Basic’s presumption was a tool to 
overcome a potential obstacle to class certification. As such, Basic’s price 
distortion analysis must be considered in light of the evolving nature of the 
class certification inquiry. In the next Part, this Article briefly describes 
the post-Basic developments in the class certification inquiry and 
considers their effect on the Basic decision. 
 
 
 186. See supra Part III.A. 
 187. See supra text accompanying notes 127–36. 
 188. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 
2179 (2011) (No. 09-1403). 
 189. Id. at 27. 
 190. The court’s analysis in Berks County Employees’ Retirement Fund v. First American Corp., 
734 F. Supp. 2d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), was similarly flawed. 
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V. THE EVOLUTION OF RULE 23 AND ITS EFFECT ON BASIC 
As noted in Part I above, Basic was decided in the context of a 
broadening acceptance of the class action and, in particular, the 
widespread view that the application of the class action to securities fraud 
litigation was particularly appropriate.
191
 Since Basic was decided, many 
courts and commentators have become more critical of class actions in 
general and securities fraud class actions in particular.
192
 
As some commentators have noted, although Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the factors that courts are to consider in 
ruling on a motion for class certification, it does not specify the applicable 
legal standard that courts should apply.
193
 The 1966 amendments to the 
Rule made the class action mechanism much more practical,
194
 a 
development that was aided by the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.
195
 In Eisen, the Court held that, in ruling on 
a motion for class certification, courts may not “conduct a preliminary 
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be 
maintained as a class action.”
196
 The Eisen decision was critical for class 
action litigation in that it led most lower courts to “limit their class action 
analysis to the pleadings, perhaps with superficial consideration of limited 
extrinsic evidence, such as expert reports.”
197
 
The Court sounded a cautionary note in 1982. In General Telephone 
Co. of Southwest v. Falcon,
198
 the Court stated that Rule 23 requires more 
than mere allegations.
199
 The Court explained that, to obtain class 
certification, a plaintiff must show that each of the requirements of the 
Rule has been met.
200
 A class action “may only be certified if the trial 
court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 
23(a) have been satisfied.”
201
 
 
 
 191. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 192. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 3. 
 193. Ian Simmons et al., Without Presumptions: Rigorous Analysis in Class Certification 
Proceedings, 21 ANTITRUST 61, 62 (2007). 
 194. See Robert G. Bone & Davis S. Evans, Class Certification and Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 1251, 1259–60 (2002) (describing the effect of the 1966 amendments). 
 195. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 196. Id. at 177. 
 197. Simmons et al., supra note 193, at 62; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in 
Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51, 51 (2004) (describing Eisen’s holding as “a pillar 
of class action practice”). 
 198. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 199. Id. at 157. 
 200. Id. at 156. 
 201. Id. at 161. 
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Although the response of the lower courts to the Falcon decision 
varied, over the past few years, the trend toward increased scrutiny of 
motions for class certification spread.
202
 Significantly, many courts noted 
potential problems with widespread use of class actions, including the fact 
that the high stakes involved increase the pressure on defendants to settle 
even weak cases.
203
 
In this context,
204
 in 2008, the Third Circuit issued an important 
decision in the Hydrogen Peroxide case, an antitrust class action.
205
 The 
court specifically found that the district court erred in applying too lenient 
a standard of proof to class certification and articulated the legal standards 
that they should apply in ruling on a motion for class certification.
206
 The 
court stated that the plaintiffs must prove all the elements of Rule 23 by a 
preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain class certification and 
that the trial courts were required to resolve all disputed issues of fact 
regarding these elements.
207
 In conducting their analysis, the Third Circuit 
explained that the courts were to make a “rigorous assessment of the 
available evidence and the method or methods by which plaintiffs propose 
to use the evidence to prove impact at trial.”
208
 
The Supreme Court endorsed this analysis in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes.
209
 In Dukes, the Court “confirmed that courts must apply a more 
 
 
 202. See Steig D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The Misguided Trend Towards Resolving Merits 
Disputes as Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935 (2009) (describing the 
cases as “chipping away” at Eisen). 
 203. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that “denying or granting class 
certification is often the defining moment in class actions (for it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the 
litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the 
part of defendants)”). The Newton court further noted that “[i]rrespective of the merits, certification 
decisions may have a decisive effect on litigation.” Id. at 167. 
 204. Linda S. Mullenix, Dropping the Spear: The Case for Enhanced Summary Judgment Prior to 
Class Certification, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1197, 1199 n.13 (2010) (“The Third Circuit's Hydrogen 
Peroxide decision joins a series of similar appellate decisions requiring heightened certification 
requirements and merits-determinations at class certification.”). 
 205. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307–09 (3d Cir. 2008). The Second 
Circuit reached a similar conclusion at around the same time. See In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia 
Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 485 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that case law requires courts to make a “definitive 
assessment that the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement has been met”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 206. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 321. 
 207. Id. at 307. 
 208. Id. at 312. The court also explained that “the court’s obligation to consider all relevant 
evidence and arguments extends to expert testimony, whether offered by a party seeking class 
certification or by a party opposing it.” Id. at 307. 
 209. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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stringent standard to class certification motions.”
210
 Dukes involved the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).
211
 In analyzing this 
requirement for purposes of class certification, the Court clarified its prior 
language in Eisen, observing that a Rule 23 inquiry might frequently 
“entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.”
212
 
The Court observed that such overlap “cannot be helped.”
213
 Moreover, as 
the Court’s analysis demonstrated, assessing the plaintiffs’ showing might 
involve evaluating expert testimony.
214
 
Although the extent to which Dukes was limited to the employment 
discrimination context was unclear,
215
 two lower courts promptly extended 
it to antitrust cases.
216
 The question presented by the Amgen case, currently 
pending before the Supreme Court, is the effect of Dukes on the manner in 
which plaintiffs are required to establish the FOTM presumption. 
Specifically, Amgen argues to the Supreme Court that proof of materiality 
is required to establish FOTM.
217
 Because FOTM is necessary to obtain 
Basic’s presumption of reliance, Amgen argues that it is necessary for 
plaintiffs not merely to allege materiality but to prove it in order to obtain 
class certification.
218
 Moreover, the “rigorous analysis” required by 
Dukes
219
 should, according to Amgen, allow it to rebut the FOTM 
presumption at the class certification stage by presenting evidence that the 
alleged misstatements were not material.
220
 
VI. REJECTING RELIANCE 
The proceduralist jurisprudence described in the preceding section 
complicates the application of the Basic presumption. As this Article has 
 
 
 210. Wesley R. Powell & Shireen Hilal, Client Memorandum, Two District Courts Interpret 
Dukes To Require “Rigorous Analysis” in Antitrust Class Certification Decisions, WILLKIE FARR & 
GALLAGHER LLP, Apr. 4, 2012, at 2, available at http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications/ 
FileUpload5686/4040/Two_District_Courts_Interpret_Dukes1.pdf. 
 211. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. at 2553–54. 
 215. See Ellen Meriwether, The “Hazards” of Dukes: Antitrust Class Action Plaintiffs Need Not 
Fear the Supreme Court’s Decision, 26 ANTITRUST 18 (2011). 
 216. Powell & Hilal, supra note 210. 
 217. Brief for Petitioners at 16–22, Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, No. 11-1085 
(Aug. 8, 2012). 
 218. Id. at 19–22. 
 219. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 220. See Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(describing Amgen’s effort to rebut the FOTM presumption). Specifically, Amgen sought to rebut the 
presumption by establishing a “truth-on-the-market” defense. Id. at 1177. 
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argued, Basic is premised on the notion of price distortion. Price distortion 
is closely related to materiality in that the essence of a material 
misstatement is its capacity to distort stock prices, although a full 
consideration of the appropriate role of event studies or other empirical 
analyses in proving materiality is beyond the scope of this Article.
221
 
Basic itself did not require proof of materiality,
222
 but the importance of 
price distortion in the conception of the market-based approach leads 
naturally to the petitioner’s argument in Amgen that materiality should be 
part of the Basic inquiry.
223
 If misinformation does not distort market 
price—because the information is not material, because the market is not 
sufficiently efficient, or because the misinformation is not credible to the 
market—then plaintiffs have not been deceived in the Basic sense of the 
term because they have not traded at a distorted price.
224
 
But price distortion becomes part of the class certification analysis only 
because Basic retained proof of reliance as an element of federal securities 
fraud.
225
 The questions presented to the Supreme Court in Amgen about 
the appropriate scope of the class certification inquiry arise only because 
Rule 23 requires a degree of commonality that is threatened by the 
necessity of establishing individual investor reliance.
226
 In the absence of a 
reliance requirement, securities fraud litigation does not present 
individualized factual or legal questions that threaten the commonality 
necessary to certify a class. 
 
 
 221. The very essence of a material misstatement is its capacity to distort stock prices. See, e.g., 
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J.) (“[I]n an efficient market the concept of 
materiality translates into information that alters the price of the firm’s stock . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Dunbar & Heller, supra note 3, at 509 (“The definition of immaterial information . . . 
is that it is already known or . . . does not have a statistically significant effect on stock price in an 
efficient market.”); see also Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011) 
(describing Halliburton’s argument that “[i]f the price is unaffected by the fraud, the price does not 
reflect the fraud”). 
 222. As discussed previously, footnote twenty-seven in the Supreme Court’s Basic opinion has 
generated some question about whether Basic also required proof of materiality. See supra notes 98–
99 and accompanying text. The Court in Halliburton declined to address this issue. See Halliburton, 
131 S. Ct. at 2187 (“[W]e need not, and do not, address any other question about Basic, its 
presumption, or how and when it may be rebutted.”). 
 223. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 224. Donald Langevoort is correct in arguing that, in some cases, material information may not 
affect securities prices. See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 173–77 (discussing In re Merck & Co. Sec. 
Litig., 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005)). But it would clearly be an expansion of the Basic principles to 
allow a plaintiff to bring a claim in reliance on a distorted market price if the market has erroneously 
failed to respond to a disclosure. 
 225. See supra Part I.C. 
 226. Cf. In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 241–43 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that 
failure to satisfy the prerequisites for application of FOTM does not necessarily preclude satisfaction 
of the predominance requirement for purposes of certifying a settlement class). 
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The developments in class certification analysis, coupled with the 
illogic of inquiring into individualized reliance, both with respect to 
impersonal market transactions generally and, in particular, under the 
Basic/Dura market-based approach, provide a compelling reason to 
overrule that aspect of Basic that retains reliance as a required element of 
federal securities fraud. As this Article has demonstrated, the reliance 
requirement is illogical in the context of a cause of action that is focused 
on market-based harm. Dan Fischel made this point years ago: reliance is 
simply inconsistent with the theory on which FOTM is based, and with the 
shift in Basic and Dura to a market-based approach.
227
 Moreover, by 
focusing on harm to the market rather than harm to individual investor 
decisions, the market-based approach creates the commonality that the 
Court found missing in Dukes. 
Overruling Basic to eliminate the reliance requirement avoids the need 
to determine, at the class certification stage, the extent to which a 
misrepresentation has distorted stock price. Proof of a public 
misrepresentation
228
 and an efficient market would be sufficient to 
establish commonality for purposes of Rule 23.
229
 Whether the Amgen 
Court should fully embrace the market-based approach is a more difficult 
question. Moving to a market-based approach implicates policy choices 
about the nature of the harm to which private securities fraud litigation 
should be addressed. A full analysis of these questions is beyond the scope 
of this Article, although I have questioned Dura’s rejection of a 
transaction-based approach to economic harm elsewhere.
230
 
Nonetheless, here are a few preliminary thoughts on the question. As a 
starting point, a market-based approach offers several advantages over the 
common law. It provides a solution to the difficult enterprise of extracting 
causal components in modern securities trading on impersonal capital 
markets. It eliminates the unreliable inquiry into the extent to which 
particular information factored into individual trading decisions. It reflects 
the reality that, although disclosures may be important to the market as a 
whole, there are entire components of market trading that occur without 
 
 
 227. See Fischel, supra note 87, at 11 (“The logic of the fraud on the market theory dictates that 
the reliance requirement as conventionally interpreted be discarded altogether.”). 
 228. In Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court held that plaintiffs 
could not establish reliance because the misstatements at issue were not communicated to the market. 
552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008). 
 229. As noted earlier, lower courts may have overstated the extent of market efficiency that is 
required for a misrepresentation to distort stock prices. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying 
text. 
 230. Fisch, supra note 125. 
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reference to those disclosures. It also eliminates the challenge presented by 
intermediated investment decisions and causal chains, in which market 
information is analyzed, combined, and disseminated through brokers, 
analysts, and the financial media. 
A market-based approach is also consistent with the ongoing shift in 
the focus of federal securities regulation from investor protection to 
market protection.
231
 Absent a concern for individual investor autonomy, 
there is little theoretical justification for focusing on investor-specific as 
opposed to market-wide responses.
232
 And protecting individual 
investment decisions may be anomalous in a market increasingly 
characterized by institutional intermediation. 
At the same time, a market-based approach sacrifices investor 
autonomy and reduces incentives for investors to engage in informed 
trading. The efficiency of the capital markets depends on the presence of 
information traders, and elimination of reliance seems to belittle the 
importance of reviewing corporate disclosures.
233
 
A market-based approach is also subject to criticism for its inherent 
reliance on the largely discredited idea that the market is value efficient. 
Although, as noted earlier, FOTM is generally based on information 
efficiency, a theory of securities fraud that is premised on price distortion 
risks drawing upon largely-discredited notions of value efficiency for its 
legitimacy.
234
 Absent some degree of value efficiency, for example, it is 
difficult to assume that a misrepresentation necessarily moves the stock 
price further away from its underlying value than the price at which it 
would have traded in the absence of the fraud. More generally, it may be 
difficult to insulate the inquiry from all considerations of value.
235
 Should 
defendants face liability, for example, for a misrepresentation that can be 
 
 
 231. This shift is reflected in the addition of section 2(b) by the National Securities Markets 
Improvements Act of 1996. See supra note 9. It is also reflected in academic commentary suggesting 
that deterrence rather than compensation should be the primary regulatory objective. See, e.g., Merritt 
B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
297 (describing deterrence rationale for private civil litigation). Arguably, a market-based approach is 
more closely tied to section 10(b)’s prohibition of manipulation than the more commonly-emphasized 
prohibition of deception. 
 232. See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 165–66 (arguing that the reliance inquiry unduly emphasizes 
compensation as a regulatory goal). 
 233. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 569–70 (1984) (observing that the rapidity of price adjustments in the market 
depends on the volume of informed trading). 
 234. See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
 235. See, e.g., In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2005) (observing that 
“as a matter of logic, we cannot say that fundamental value efficiency has no place in applying the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance at the class-certification stage”). 
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shown to make market price more accurately reflect fundamental value? 
What significance should be given to abnormal returns that correlate with 
disclosure, but that are directionally inconsistent with plaintiffs’ theory? 
This concern is heightened by the tendency for event studies to be 
presented not simply as evidence of a price effect but as a quantification of 
the size of that effect—as in event studies that are used to establish loss 
causation or damages.
236
 Most circuits have required plaintiffs, in proving 
loss causation, not merely to show that the corrective disclosure correlated 
with a decline in stock price, but that it was a “substantial cause” of that 
decline.
237
 This inquiry injects an implicit significance not just to the fact 
but to the extent of the stock price reaction. 
As discussed above, the market-based approach also creates a 
fundamental shift in both the victim class and the scope of recoverable 
harm.
238
 There may be policy reasons that counsel in favor or against that 
shift, based on the information about existing recoveries from securities 
fraud litigation.
239
 More problematically, it is possible to read Basic and 
Dura, in combination, as limiting recoverable damages to the lesser of ex 
ante or ex post price distortion.
240
 To the extent that a market-based 
approach has this effect, it is likely to reduce overall damage awards 
because of the effect of external causal factors on stock price as time 
passes between the misrepresentation and the fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic gave investors, as “an act of 
juristic grace,”
241
 the right not to trade securities at a price distorted by 
fraud. Although this right was founded upon a sophisticated understanding 
of the realities of public market securities trading, the Court grounded the 
right in the antiquated common law concept of reliance.
242
 As the Court 
has recognized elsewhere, however, common law tort principles have only 
 
 
 236. See supra note 145. 
 237. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 388 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 238. See supra Part III.A. 
 239. See Fisch, supra note 125, at 868–69. Alternatively, it is possible to separate the liability 
inquiry from the damage analysis. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389–97 (1970). 
 240. Note that Basic can, but need not, be read to set an alternative limit on recoverable damages 
that is lower than that established by Dura. 
 241. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 195. 
 242. See supra Part I.C. 
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limited relevance in determining the appropriate regulatory structure to 
protect the public securities markets.
243
 
Halliburton offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to consider 
directly the role of price distortion analysis in defining the contours of 
10b-5 liability. Critically, the Court’s opinion appeared to reiterate the 
centrality of price distortion
244
 but did not offer the lower courts guidance 
in how to analyze the issue. Instead, by focusing exclusively on the Fifth 
Circuit’s characterization of its inquiry in terms of loss causation, 
Halliburton retained, without justification, the antiquated reliance inquiry. 
An evolving judicial approach to the class certification inquiry has 
rendered the Basic inquiry increasingly problematic. Although price 
distortion may be critical to the market-based theory of securities fraud on 
which Basic and the Court’s later cases are based, importing the event 
study methodology into the courts’ analysis of class certification threatens 
to give questionable empirical methodologies undue legal significance. 
One possible solution is to overrule Basic to eliminate the FOTM 
presumption. Although some commentators have advocated this approach, 
a better choice is to eliminate the reliance requirement altogether. 
Rejecting reliance removes the complex analysis of price distortion from 
the class certification analysis and is consistent with the modern realities 
of the public securities markets. 
Solving the litigation problems presented in Halliburton and Amgen is, 
of course, only a partial solution. This Article does not address the larger 
questions of how courts should analyze the relationship between price 
distortion and materiality, and the extent to which empirical studies should 
inform that analysis.
245
 Going forward, however, these decisions highlight 
the crucial need for courts and regulators to understand more fully the 
effects of price distortion on the securities markets and to evaluate the 
consequences of providing a remedy for those effects. 
 
 
 243. See, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005) (observing that a private 
claim for federal securities fraud “resembles, but is not identical to, common-law tort actions for deceit 
and misrepresentation”). 
 244. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011) (describing 
“Basic’s fundamental premise—that an investor presumptively relies on a misrepresentation so long as 
it was reflected in the market price at the time of his transaction”) (emphasis added). 
 245. For discussion of this question, see Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality 
Issues in Disclosures that Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 927 (2007) 
(identifying difficulty of equating materiality analysis with price movements). 
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